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ANTITRUST LIMITS ON EXPLOITING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
DAVID R. BOYKo*

The transfer and manipulation of intellectual property rights
has grown into a large segment of both the United States and international economies and resulted in an increased need for antitrust regulation. 1 Although intellectual property rights generally exist as statutory monopolies, these rights are not absolute,
and antitrust law serves to delineate the contours of those monopolies. This paper addresses the limitations that antitrust law
places on business planning and conduct and explores how antitrust law functions as a restriction and boundary to the legality
and validity of conduct that is lawful under intellectual property
law. The first part of this paper discusses the statutory monopolies created when a copyright or patent is granted. It goes
on to analyze the antitrust limits on intellectual property, such
as tying agreements and attempted monopolization. Finally,
this paper explains and chronicles the conflict between intellectual property and antitrust laws as evidenced by disputes over
"free riding" and market definitions.
* B.S., Cornell University; M.A., University of Southern California; J.D., University
of California Los Angeles School of Law. David Boyko is resident in the Los Angeles office
of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, where his practice emphasizes corporate
litigation and antitrust counseling involving intellectual property issues. He has coauthored several articles on antitrust law for the Practicing Law Institute and BNA's
Corporate Counsel Weekly.
1 See Jeffrey B. Aaronson & Lisa R. Scalapone, Antitrust Laws Can Hit High-Tech
Targets, Too, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 2, 1998, at A20 (explaining current Microsoft litigation);
Carl Bergetz, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.: One Lump or Two?, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 22,
1997, at 5 (discussing litigation and possible implications for antitrust law); William Holstein et. al., Going After Microsoft: Washington's New Trustbusters are Challenging Two
Technology Giants, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 5, 1997, at 2224-26 (discussing DOJ
claim that Microsoft was competing unfairly against Netscape by demanding that personal computer makers include Microsoft's browser and explaining that this case signals
new era in antitrust enforcement); see also Neal R.Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, "U.S. v. Microsoft" Round I, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1998, at 3 (explaining injunction against Microsoft's
tying its Internet browser to licensing of operating software Windows '95).
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I. THE STATUTORY MONOPOLIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Antitrust law benefits the public by promoting and protecting
a competitive marketplace. 2 Intellectual property rights, on the
other hand, are essentially statutory monopolies in which the
state grants the owner certain exclusive rights with respect to
the property. A patent grants the owner exclusive rights to prevent others from making or selling the invention in the United
States and to exclude others from the field claimed by the invention, thereby creating a statutory monopoly. 3 As a policy, patent
law seeks to induce the introduction of new innovations into the
market. The public benefits from increased competition as well
4
as a faster pace of innovation.
Similarly, a copyright grants the owner a narrower monopoly,
in order to prevent others from "copying" an original work. An
original work can take many different forms: a literary work; a
musical work; a dramatic work; a pantomime or choreographed
representations; a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work; a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a sound recording; or architectural work. 5 This grant not only imbues the owner with
exclusive rights to reproduce and prepare derivative works, but
also to publicly distribute, perform, and display the protected
works. 6 Moreover, copyright law, similar to patent law, initially
garners the owner a return for creativity, while ultimately bene2 Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998) [hereinafter "Kodak If'] (stating that antitrust law
seeks to promote and protect competitive marketpalce for benefit of general public); see
also Lawrence L.C. Lee, Taiwan's Antitrust Statutes: Proposalsfor a Regulatory Regime
and Comparisonof U.S. and Taiwanese Antitrust Law, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583,
586 (1996) (stating goal of antitrust law is to ensure consumer welfare and market efficiency through fair market competition); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV.
1097, 1100 (1993) (noting that antitrust law promotes competition, not competitors).
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (West 1998) (describing provisions which every patent must
contain, excluding rights of all others but holder of patent); 5 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02 (1997).
4 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1214 (explaining that patent laws provide inventor with
power to exclude others from selling, making or using patented inventions and benefits
public by faster introduction of new inventions as well as increased competition in market); see also Brian G. Brunsvold & William H. Pratt, Intellectual Property Rights- What
Are They and How Does a Company Secure Them? in GOING INTERNATIONAL: FUN.
DAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, at 137, 140 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study No. SB04, 1996) (discussing nature of issued patents and effects on marketplace).
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (West 1998) (listing categories of copyrights).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (West 1998) (articulating specific and exclusive rights possessed
by copyright holder).
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fiting the public in the form of increased artistic creativity.
Traditionally, copyright and patent rights were considered
near absolute and therefore, were note generally analyzed under
antitrust law principles. Over the last several decades, however,
certain aspects of intellectual property use have come under increased antitrust scrutiny. As a result, these uses were curbed
and led to emerging boundaries for permissible uses of those
statutory monopolies.

II. ANTITRUST LIMITS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Vertical exploitation of intellectual property rights can be described as the attempt to leverage dominance of a good or service
in its derivative or aftermarkets. For example, a company may
seek to leverage its strength in the market for its minicomputers
in the markets for those minicomputers' parts or maintenance
services. Moreover, the company may require purchasers of a
specific computer operating system to also purchase a CPU
manufactured by that company. Current antitrust law limits
vertical exploitation by restraining tying arrangements and attempted monopolization of a market different from the market in
8
which the protected good or service is sold.
A. Tying Agreements
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 9 tying agreements are
unlawful in those situations where: (1) the tied and tying products are two distinct products; (2) there is an express or implied
agreement or condition establishing a tie between their purchase; (3) the defendant has sufficient market power for the ty7 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1214 (asserting that copyright law protects authors'
rights and ensures fair return for "creative labor" while simultaneously "stimulating artistic creativity" for benefit of public); see also Thomas Arno, Use Restrictions and the Retention of Property Interests in Chattels Through Intellectual Property Right, 31 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 279, 280 (1994) (noting that congressional copyright protection stimulates
innovation).
8 See, e.g. Russell Lombardy, The Myth of Market Power: Why Market Power Should
Not Be Presumed When Applying Antitrust Principles to the Analysis of Tying Agreements
Involving Intellectual Property, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 449, 463-464 (1996) (explaining

that in situation where products can be marketed separately and have distinct appeal to
customers, tying occurs if seller leaves buyer no option but to buy both products as package).
9 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 1998).
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ing product to distort choices for the tied product; (4) and the tie
forecloses a substantial amount of commerce in the market for
the tied product. 10
The antitrust boundaries of tying claims are relatively clear.
In Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp.,ll the Ninth Circuit was
the first court to hold that if the tying product is protected by a
copyright or patent, the defendant will be presumed to have
market power over that product. 12 In Data General, Digidyne
sued Data General because of Data General's refusal to license
its copyrighted "RDOS" operating system software to those who
did not also purchase its "NOVA" central processing unit
("CPU"). 1 3 Because RDOS was not compatible with all computers, Digidyne had developed a niche market for its own CPUs,
which emulated the NOVA processor and thus could run
RDOS.

14

The more incompatible or noninterchangeable a product is, the
stronger the presumption of market strength. 15 For example,
customers who were resellers and combined a NOVA CPU with
their own application software, were effectively locked-in to
10 See id. (declaring every contract in restraint of trade is illegal); 15 U.S.C. §14
(West 1998) (prohibiting any agreement between seller/lessor and buyer/lessee that
would restrict latter from purchasing goods or services from competitor of former); see
also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (lst Cir. 1994)
(explaining that negative tying is forbidden under Sherman Act); Ronald L. Johnston,
Exclusion of Third Party Maintenance Companies, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1996, at 241, 247-50 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 449, 1996) (examining tying arrangements as "per se" violation of Sherman Act); Jill Dickey Protos, Kodak v. Image Technical Services: A Setback
for the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1199, 1206 (1993)

(discussing requirements of declaring tying arrangements per se illegal under Sherman
Act).
11 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
12 See Digidyne Gen. Corp. v. Data General, 734 F.2d at 1336. Data General was alleged to have refused to license its copyrighted "RDOS" operating system software to
those who did not also purchase its "NOVA" CPU. Id. Data General held the copyright for
RDOS, so the Court presumed that the statutory monopoly endowed the company with
market power for that product. Id.
13 See id. at 1338.
14 See id. (noting that economic power of tying product is remaining element necessary to establish per se violation).
15 This factor is often described as "switching costs" or customer "lock-in." See generally Kodak II, 125 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998)
(discussing how unique parts of Kodak products make switching to different products
more costly); Neil D. Van Dalsem, Service Now Sold Separately: The Supreme Court Expands the Per Se Prohibition of Tying Arrangements in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, 28 TULSA L.J. 817, 821 (1993) (noting that sellers often capitalize by
imposing ties after buyer has become "locked in").
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RDOS because software written for RDOS was not compatible
with other operating systems. 1 6 As a result, the large initial investment in writing codes compatible with RDOS resulted in
customers who were reluctant to convert to a different operating
system. 1 7 The incompatibility of RDOS thus distorted the competition in the CPU market. 18 Although Data General argued
that the CPU market was sufficiently competitive to preclude its
ability to exert market power, the court considered competition
in the tied market to be irrelevant. 19 The court ruled that where
the tying agreement is express and involves a copyright or patent, it is per se unlawful. 2 0 As a result, further inquiry into the
tied market was unnecessary.
Data General outlined antitrust's limitations on intellectual
property rights, but the limitations were not further clarified
until 1992 in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. ("Kodak 1").21 The Kodak I decision answered some of the
questions left uncertainly open in the intellectual property arena
of antitrust law. Kodak manufactured advanced photocopy and
microfilm equipment as a primary market. In addition, Kodak
competed with independent source organizations ("ISOs") in the
aftermarkets for replacement parts, and for service and repairs. 2 2 Notwithstanding the fact that Kodak repaired at least
16 See Data General, 734 F.2d at 1342 (holding refusal to license software systems
unlawful).
17 See id. (articulating how customers of defendants are compelled to purchase certain software).
18 See id. at 1346-47. Although Data General argued that there was substantial competition in the relevant market for CPUs and, therefore, it did not have sufficient power
to distort consumer choices, the court was unpersuaded because tying is per se unlawful.
Id. As a result, the degree of competition in the tied product market is irrelevant. Id.; see
also Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 744-46 (E.D. Mi. 1995).
The court addressed a similar tying arrangement between software and CPUs. Id. at 742.
In this case, the seller of mainframe CPU time alleged that EDS conditioned the lease of
its computer graphics design software used for design of GM autos on the purchase of
CPU time on EDS' own mainframe. Id. at 742-743.
19 See Data General, 734 F.2d at 1338 (documenting prerequisites which yield an
unlawful tying arrangement).
20 See id. at 1346; see also Tricom, 902 F. Supp. at 745. Although it did not decide the
issue following a strict antitrust analysis, the court reached a similar conclusion and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. The court noted well-established
case law that a patent or copyright holder may not extend the reach of that grant to
other products or markets. Id. at 745.
21 504 U.S. 451 (1992) [hereinafter "Kodak f'].
22 See id. at 457-58. The ISOs sold Kodak parts, as well as repaired Kodak machines
using those parts. Id. at 455. However, Kodak did not manufacture all of the necessary
parts itself. Id. It exclusively manufactured only approximately one-third of the total
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80% of the machines it manufactured, ISOs had been able to
provide cheaper and better service. 2 3 In the mid-1980s, Kodak
began restricting the ISOs' access to those replacement parts
Kodak manufactured, and those purchased from other manufacturers. 2 4 Therefore, ISOs contended they could not effectively
compete with Kodak because they lacked access to these replacement parts. 25 The ISOs filed suit against Kodak in 1987.26
The ISOs alleged that Kodak had tied the purchase of aftermarket parts to service contracts and used its control over the parts
market to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, the service
market. 27 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision reversed
Kodak's successful motion for summary judgment. 28 Kodak
subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Kodak first argued that parts and service constituted only a
single derivative market because the demand for parts was
29
functionally and inextricably linked to the demand for service.
According to Kodak, the interdependency of those aftermarket
items precluded the separation of those markets. The Court
ruled, however, that two products could exist in separate markets even though each required the other in order to be of any
use. 3 0 In its second argument, Kodak contended that even if two
parts, contracted exclusively with other companies for others, and had no control over
the manufacture of many of the remaining parts. Id. at 458.
23 See id. at 458, 483 (explaining some Kodak equipment owners actually prefer ISO
service).
24 See id. at 458.
25 Id.

26 Id. (explaining allegations of unlawfulness of Kodak's policies); see also Daniel M.
Wall, Aftermarket Monopoly Five Years After Kodak, 11 ANTITRUST 32, 32 (1997)

(emphasizing range of concerns regarding effects of Kodak decision).
27 See Kodak I, 504 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1992); see also Jeffrey J. Keyes, Tying, Exclusive Dealing and FranchisingIssues, in 38TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, at

1017, 1035 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 987, 1997) (noting that
tying remains subject to per se analysis under Kodak 1). But see Fortner Enter., Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969) (recognizing instances when tying is
subject to rule of reason analysis).
28 See Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 454 (highlighting purpose of appeal generally, Kodak's
claim specifically); see also Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and
Antitrust: More Objectivity Than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 407 (1994) (explaining

Court's rationale for summary judgment review); Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In
Analysis After Kodak- Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 263, 263 (1994) (citing Kodak I).
29 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 463.
30 See id. at 462-63. The Court recognized that many items, such as tires and automobiles are inextricably united. Id. Kodak's argument was also defeated on factual
grounds. Id. The ISOs presented evidence that Kodak's own conduct demonstrated that
separate markets existed. Id.
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markets existed, it lacked market power in the tying market for
32
parts. 3 1 The Court rejected this assertion on factual grounds.
Finally, Kodak asserted that even if it did possess such market
power, competition in the primary market for photocopier and
micrographic equipment precluded Kodak from exercising that
power unlawfully. 33 Kodak argued that it was precluded because if it had raised prices in one of the derivative markets, it
would have lost sales in the primary market. 3 4 However, the
Court held there was insufficient factual support for Kodak's
35
position.
The Kodak I Court emphasized that the switching and information costs associated with Kodak's products tended to defeat
its claim of highly cross-linked demand between the primary
market and aftermarkets. 3 6 Because the equipment was incom31 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 488 (explaining products can be tied but still not impose
market restraints); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist., No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12
(1984) (arguing exclusivity as dangerous force and decisive factor in arrangements).
32 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 464-65. The ISOs had presented sufficient evidence to
establish a triable issue of fact regarding Kodak's possession of appreciable market
power. Id. at 464. Their evidence demonstrated that Kodak had taken effective steps to
reduce the availability of parts and used machines (which could be cannibalized for parts)
in the aftermarket, and that some customers had switched to service contracts with Kodak because the ISOs they preferred had been squeezed out of business by Kodak's practices. Id.
33 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 470 n.16 (asking whether Kodak has market power over
both copiers and micrographic equipment). See generally Severin Borenstein et. al., Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 455, 458 (1995) (noting Court's recognition of anticompetitive possibilities even with tied products).
34 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 470-72. In other words, there was a high cross-elasticity
of demand between the primary and aftermarkets. Id. Moreover, Kodak occupied only a
small share of the overall market for similar office equipment. Id.
35 See id. at 473 n.20. There was no evidence that Kodak had either lowered prices in
the derivative markets to increase primary market share or had decreased its prices in
the primary market to increase its position in derivative markets. Id. at 477. Additionally, even if such cross-elasticity of demand between the primary and secondary markets
did exist, Kodak would have to have shown that customers had accurate lifecycle costs
which would permit such calculations and comparisons among primary market competitors. Id. The Court noted that to prevail Kodak would had to have shown that the relevant consumers were able to adequately inform themselves of "price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance the initial equipment, as well
as service and repair costs, including estimates of breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of 'downtime,' and losses incurred from downtime" as well as equally detailed information regarding the primary equipment purchase.
Id. at 473.
36 See generally Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 7 (1993) (arguing that customers will absorb higher costs when alternative of abandoning investment will also be costly); Michael W. Klass & Richard T.
Rapp, Litigating the Key Economic Issues Under Kodak, 7 ANTITRUST 14, 15 (1993)
(explaining examination of package deals and possible related high switching costs); Barbara A. Reeves & David R. Boyko, Antitrust Issues for Markets and Aftermarkets, in 37TH
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patible with competing products, the high switching costs tended
to "lock-in" customers, permitting supra-competitive (or monopolistic) pricing. The Court further considered the degree of
linkage suspect because Kodak did not demonstrate that its customers possessed enough information to make detailed lifecycle
cost comparisons before they purchased the primary equipment. 3 7 Moreover, Kodak failed to show that its more restrictive
aftermarket distribution policy did not change those comparison
figures. 3 8 Thus, the tying claim was not properly resolved by the
motion for summary judgment.
Despite these antitrust limitations, similar effects can be
achieved through creative licensing structures. In Data General
Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.,39 Data General was
alleged to have unlawfully tied licensing for its advanced
"ADEX" diagnostic software to the purchase of other support
services. 40 The tying claim failed because Data General's licens41
ing program effectively obviated the need for a "tied" product.
ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING, at 999, 1011

(PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1031, 1998) (discussing high
switching costs because of incompatibility of Kodak products and other parts).
37 See generally Victoria E. Brieant & Paul S. Schmidtberger, Information Costs,
Lifecycle Costs, Switching Costs and Lock-In, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ANTITRUST LAW
AFTER KODAK AND TICOR: MARKET DEFINITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ECONOMIC THEORY,
AND STATE ACTION, at 97, 102 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C847, 1993) (explaining

Kodak I Court's rationale that lifecycle pricing is not only difficult but may be inaccurate); Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The Staggering
Implications of Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposal for
Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336, 353 (1993) (noting consumer's reluctance to engage
in costly lifecycle pricing comparison).
38 See Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 473-77 (elaborating on maintenance agreement for repair
services).
39 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
40 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d at 1156. The claim
was brought by Grumman as an independent service organization (ISO) for post-sales
support of Data General hardware and a competitor in that market. Id. In the mid-80s,
Data General had refused to license its most advanced diagnostic software, ADEX, to
ISOs and limiting licenses to its own technicians and in-house technicians for customers
providing their own maintenance service. Id. at 1155.
41 See generally Ronald F. Kehoe et. al., Tying: The Current Balance Between Per Se
and Rule of Reason Analysis, in ANTITRUST1INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HIGH

TECHNOLOGY MARKETS, at 233, 258 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C137, 1995)
(recognizing reluctance to find illegality in absence of proof of coercion of customers);
Judy L. Whalley & Carole E. Handler, Exclusive Dealing, Full-Line Forcing and Tying
Arrangements, in 34TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION AND

at 223, 250 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 876, 1995)
(discussing exclusion of owners from use of copyrighted work); Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-IncreasingPractices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 83 (1997) (noting feasibility of separating software and repair services by Data
General).
MARKETING,
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Data General did not require its customers to also contract for
Data General's support services. Instead, the company licensed
the ADEX software only to those who voluntarily signed a cooperative maintenance agreement and an agreement that the systems purchased were only for their own use or for resale as an
authorized distributor. 42 The use of ADEX also was included in
Data General's support services options for those customers who
did not choose to participate in maintenance software agreements. 43 The cooperative maintenance agreement was a precondition for licensing, rather than the purchase of support
services; Grumman therefore failed to establish a tied product or
market. 44 Moreover, consumers were not coerced into becoming
self-maintainers and so the tying claim was reduced 4 5 to a re46
fusal to license and ultimately failed.
Similar success was achieved in Advanced Computer Services
of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp.,47 MAI was sued by
seven ISOs who held a collective 10% share of the service market 48 for specialized minicomputers sold and served by MAI.49
42 See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1154 (elaborating on maintenance agreement for repair services).
43 See id. Data General's reliance on the cooperative maintenance agreement as a
conditioning vehicle for licensing diagnostic software also provided an aesthetically appealing business solution by not driving customers away. Id. Those customers that purchased support services from Data General had access to the diagnostics through the
regular service package. Id. at 1155. Those customers who performed their own maintenance (or were authorized distributors) were unaffected, as the maintenance agreement
merely formalized a pre-existing state of affairs. Id. at 1155. The only customers who suffered were the ISOs seeking to use Data General's products to compete against it in the
service aftermarket, and the loss of license revenues was offset by the decrease in competition in that aftermarket. Id.
44 Id. at 1181. The Court determined that Grumman's allegation of tying between
ADEX service and DG support service failed because there was no proof that these were
"truly distinct products." Id.
45 See Anthony L. Clapes, Software, Copyright and Competition: The Use of Antitrust
Theory to Undercut Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANTITRUST: 1995, at 553, 557 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 414, 1995) (discussing Court's rationale for finding of no illegality); Reeves & Boyko, supra note 36, at 1005 (discussing implications of
holding in Data General).
46 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187-89 (lst Cir. 1994).
The Court held that "while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolists' unilateral
refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to
consumers." Id. The Court concluded that Grumman could not overcome this presumption. Id.
47 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. VA. 1994).
48 See Advanced Computer Serv. of Michigan,Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. at
359.
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The ISOs alleged that MAI had monopolized the service aftermarket and unlawfully tied its copyrighted operating and diagnostic software with repair and maintenance services. 50 The focus of the ISOs' disagreement was MAI's license for its software,
which limited use only to authorized licensees and MAI.51 Thus
the ISOs were unable to use that software in connection with
their servicing tasks. 5 2 Similar to Data General, despite the existence of two separate products (software and service), the tying
claim failed because there was no explicit agreement tying the
two products. 5 3 The Court stated that:
MAI's decision to license selectively, rather than sell, its
copyrighted software.. .is not evidence of an illegal tying
agreement. It is within MAI's discretion to protect its copyrighted works, and... [s]uch selective licensing, .... does not
constitute evidence of an express, or even implied, tying
agreement.

54

Recent cases further demonstrate that licensing offers a lawful
mechanism for the exploitation of intellectual property rights
49 See id. at 359 (explaining suit brought by seven ISOs who, combined, only constitute 10% of market share).
50 See id. at 368 n.15 (elaborating on services provided by MAI).
51 See J.T. Westermeir, Exclusion of Third Party Maintenance Companies: The Battle
Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AN-

TITRUST 1997, at 741, 752 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 483, 1997) (explaining allegation that MAI tried to monopolize service aftermarket); see also Marcia Howe Adams, Reexamining the Per Se Tying
Rule, in ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS:
LITIGATION AND ADVISING IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY, at 29, 36 (ALI-ABA Course of

Study No. CA26, 1996) (highlighting claim of monopolization by seven ISOs against
MAI); William T. Lifland, Antitrust Aspects of Third Party Equipment Maintenance, in
COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND THE INTERNET, at 7, 31 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
& Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 415, 1995) (outlining implications of MAI
decision).
52 See Advanced Computer Serv., 845 F. Supp. at 359-60 (alleging that MAI "is impermissibly using its copyrights to preclude competition in MAI computer maintenance
and repair" by limiting use to only authorized licensees and MAI).
53 See id. at 1187 (holding for MAI). Cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1152 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding for defendant Data General); see also
David Bender, ISO Use of System Software: Copyright Infringement?... Or Antitrust Violation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1994, at 107, 124-30 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 390, 1994) (comparing
MAI with Data General).
54 See Advanced Computer Serv., 845 F.Supp. at 368 (concluding further that plaintiffs could not maintain per se nor rule of reason tying claim because there was no tying
arrangement); see also Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding that selective licensing by Data General did not constitute illegal
tying arrangement).
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through what otherwise would be deemed exclusionary conduct. 5 5 Aftermarket linkages can be achieved through appropriate conditions and restrictions, so long as they remain couched
as conditions, rather than ties.
B. Attempted Monopolization
Antitrust law restrains the ability of an intellectual property
holder to exploit the full potential of those property rights. On
numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has held that the power
derived from legal advantages such as a patent or copyright can
give rise to antitrust liability if the seller exerts his dominance in
one market in order to expand his empire into the next. 5 6 Attempted monopolization of a derivative or aftermarket is unlawful under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 5 7 when: (1) the defendant
has a specific intent to control prices or destroy competition in
the relevant market; (2) the defendant practices predatory or
anticompetitive conduct, with the intent of achieving the foregoing objective; (3) there is a dangerous probability of achieving
58
that objective; and (4) the plaintiff suffers antitrust injury.
In attempted monopolization claims, a company typically restricts access to its intellectual property in one derivative market
to increase its market share in a second derivative market. As a
result, a competitor, or group of competitors, brings suit. A
finding of antitrust liability in cases involving such restraints
typically turns on two primary factors: (1) the definition of the
55 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec., 272 U.S. 476, 491 (1926) (affirming that
conditions imposed by patentee which licensee agreed to, such as price fixing will be upheld by courts as legal); see also Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704-05
(Fed.Cir. 1992) (reiterating that patent holder may grant license with condition of performance that is reasonably within patent holder's legitimate control); Lucasarts Entertainment Co. v. Humongous Entertainment Co., 870 F.Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(finding that price restriction in license agreement did not violate Sherman Act because
it was "reasonably adapted to secure the pecuniary reward for the [Lucas Arts' lawful]
monopoly").
56 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (quoting Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)) (stating further Court has not adopted any exception to usual antitrust analysis, with respect to derivative aftermarkets).
57 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (West 1998) (establishing antitrust policy and procedure).
58 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998)
(setting forth what is required to prevail on section 2 claim); see also Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (holding that "petitioners may not be liable
for attempted monopolization under section 2 of Sherman Act absent proof of dangerous
probability that they would monopolize a particular market and specific intent to monopolize").
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relevant market, which is proportionate to the relative incompatibility with its competitors of the product which incorporates
the intellectual property; and (2) whether there has been a restrictive change in the established distribution path for that in59
tellectual property, which is considered anti-competitive.
1. Defining the Relevant Market
The Kodak I decision seems to have had the greatest impact on
intellectual property rights because it established two new
boundaries on the scope of intellectual property rights. The first
limit exists where the product at issue is incompatible with its
competitors'. The Kodak I court reasoned that a relevant market
was to be determined from the consumer's perspective and the
choices available from that perspective. 60 Kodak's equipment
was incompatible with that of its competitors'. Therefore, the
consumer's inability to easily switch between brands limited the
relevant service market to "only those companies that service
Kodak machines." 6 1 In essence the court implicitly asserted that
the Sherman Act was a consumer protection statute.
After the Kodak I decision, if one product is incompatible with
its competitors, that brand constitutes the relevant market for
antitrust purposes. As a matter of law, the exclusivity of intellectual property rights provides the manufacturers with monopoly power in that product's market. 6 2 A single brand can form
the entire market, while the owner of those rights will hold de
facto, as well as de jure, monopoly power. 6 3 The single brand
market of Kodak, however, will not automatically exist because
of mere incompatibility. Subsequent courts have pursued addi59 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (describing elements of illegal monopolization under section 2 of Sherman Act).
60 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (concluding that proper market is determined "only after a factual inquiry into the commercial realities faced by consumers")
(quoting U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 572).
61 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 482 (stating some instances where one brand of product
can constitute separate market).
62 See generally W. Todd Miller & Donald I. Baker, Resale Price Maintenance and
Related Restraints, in 37TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR; DISTRIBUTION AND

MARKETING, at 9, 89 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1031, 1998)
(noting ownership of trademarks, patents, copyrights is same as congressionally mandated monopolies).
63 See id. This can also be envisioned as an inverse relationship between the uniqueness of the intellectual property and the size of the relevant market it will be measured
against. Id.
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tional analyses to determine the actual level at which product
incompatibility should be measured.
64
In Tarrant Service Agency, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc.,
the defendant's primary equipment required three types of parts
in the aftermarket: "genuine," duplicator (which could substitute
for genuine), and generic. 6 5 The court noted that even though
genuine and duplicator parts were not compatible with the other
manufacturers' equipment, all three categories of parts were
reasonably interchangeable substitutes for each other.6 6 Each
could be used to repair the equipment. 67 Consequently, the
combined market for all three parts was the relevant market in
68
which to measure incompatibility.
Any attempt to define the relevant market is further complicated by the existence of bundled products. Digital Equipment
0
Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies69 illustrates this problem. 7
Digital Equipment Corp. ("DEC") sold its computers at a discount to another company which then bundled the computer
71
with its own adapted version of the UNIX operating system.
However, DEC withdrew its price discounting policy for those
customers who had been reselling the bundled system once DEC
developed its own adaptation of UNIX. 7 2 Uniq eventually sued
DEC for attempting to monopolize the operating systems market

64 12 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 1993).
65 See Tarrant Serv., 12 F.3d at 612. The dispute arose because the defendant implemented a more restrictive policy for aftermarket sales of genuine parts so as to limit
competition for sales of parts. Id. The plaintiff was appealing from a motion granting
judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a jury verdict finding that the defendant
had monopolized the parts aftermarket. Id.
66 See id. at 614 (stating generic parts are reasonably interchangeable and all parts
can substitute for others in repair scenarios).
67 See id. The court noted, "[a]lthough generic parts can be used for a multitude of
different purposes, they can certainly be used for the same purpose of repairing Trane
products. Id. Thus, generic parts have reasonable interchangeability with Trane genuine
parts for the purpose of repairing Trane equipment and are part of the relevant market."
Id.
68 See id. at 615 (noting that court affirmed order granting judgment for Trane because Tarrant failed to produce evidence of relevant market as well as Trane's supposed
monopoly in market).
69 73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996).
70 See Digital Equip. Corp., 73 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that manufacturer's policy of including operating system with each of its computers was not violation
of antitrust law).
71 See id. (discussing contractual arrangement giving rise to this dispute).
72 See id. at 758 (detailing cancellation of contract between DEC and Uniq).
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3

7
for DEC computers.
The court declined to adopt Uniq's contention that a computer
without an operating system existed as a relevant market. 7 4 Instead, the court concluded that an operating system is an essential element of a computer. All manufacturers include "an operating system with the physical parts that make up a computer.
Consumers are free to buy and install additional operating systems."7 5 Thus, DEC's true product was computational power
and the relevant market was for mid-range computer systems
that provided similar amounts of computational power. In that
broader market, DEC held less than the thirty percent share
deemed necessary to confer market power. 76 Moreover, the
UNIX operating system could operate on any of the competing
computer systems. 7 7 This left customers free to change hardware brands without changing operating systems, and DEC
could not extract monopolistic prices for its hardware. 7 8 Thus,
DEC was free to change the terms for hardware sales to its resellers without incurring antitrust liability.
In Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 79 the court
concluded that the relevant market was broader than the products at issue. 80 Queen City Pizza, a Domino's franchise, alleged
that Domino's had monopolized the aftermarket for pizza sup-

73 See id. The suit had originated with DEC suing Uniq for payment of a promissory
note held by DEC. Id. Uniq raised the antitrust issue as a counterclaim. Id. Uniq's counterclaim was dismissed before trial, and that result was affirmed in the Seventh Circuit's
opinion discussed herein, which was authored by the highly respected Judge Easterbrook. Id.
74 See id. at 760-761 (stating Uniq accused DEC of monopolization because DEC
shipped operating systems with each computer distributed).
75 See id. at 761. The court explained that this arrangement "is not a reduction of
competition; the process is competition." Id.
76 See id. at 761 (concluding thirty percent is not "enough to confer substantial market power"); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984)
(stating that hospital having thirty percent of market did not have monopoly power over
that market); Twin Labs., Inc. v. Welder Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2nd Cir.
1990) (reiterating that thirty-three percent market share does not constitute "dangerous
probability of success" to monopolize).
77 See Digital Equip. Corp., 73 F.3d at 763 (stating that Uniq customers are not required to use any particular hardware).
78 See id. at 762. The court concluded that "[i]nstead of paying DEC for something
they did not want, customers will turn elsewhere- for other firms can increase their profits by satisfying users' demand." Id.
79 124 F.3d 430 (3rd Cir. 1997).
80 See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 437-440 (3rd Cir. 1997)
(discussing relevant markets and significance of interchangeable nature of products in
defining markets).
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plies by requiring suppliers' and distributors' approval for its
franchisees. 8 1 Queen City further alleged that monopolization
allowed Domino's to provide 90% of the supplies and ingredients
used in the stores. 8 2 Relying on Kodak, the franchisees had narrowly defined the relevant market as consisting solely of Domino's pizza supplies. 8 3 That market definition was unsuccessful
because its boundaries were determined by a contractual relationship, the franchise agreement, rather than requisite cross84
elasticity of demand or product interchangeability.
The court emphasized that:
The test for a relevant market is not commodities reasonably
interchangeable by a particular plaintiff, but 'commodities
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.' A court making the relevant market determination
looks not to the contractual restraints assumed by a particular plaintiff when determining whether a product is interchangeable, but to the uses to which the product is put by
consumers in general. Thus, the relevant inquiry here is...
whether pizza makers in general might use products interchangeably. 8 5
The products were not unique. As a result, Kodak I did not
apply and Domino's supplies did not constitute a single brand
86
market.
A broad market definition may also exist where the products
are a subset of a larger grouping of products which have independent importance to the consumer. Following its loss after a
jury trial, Kodak argued in Image Technical Services, Inc. v.

81 See id. at 434. Domino's exerted this control by reserving the right, in its standard
franchise agreement, to require franchisees to purchase ingredients, supplies, and materials exclusively from Domino's or approved suppliers or distributors. Id.
82 See id. at 433 (noting that Domino's, Inc. sells large proportion of $500 million in
ingredients and supplies used by Domino's franchisees).
83 See id. at 438. Plaintiffs asserted that the relevant market failed because it did
not include interchangeable products. Id. On the contrary, plaintiffs mistakenly limited
the market to products currently approved by Domino's, Inc. Id.
84 See id. at 437-41 (rejecting plaintiffs' proposed relevant market because market
cannot be restricted solely to those products that Domino's Pizza Inc. currently approved
for use by Domino's franchisees).
85 See id. at 438. The court went on to state that no court has defined a relevant
market by utilizing references to the plaintiffs particular contractual restraints. Id.
86 See id. at 440 (distinguishing Kodak I by concluding that differences between Kodak's transactions and franchise relationships are compelling).
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Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak I1")87 that the trial court had improperly defined the parts market as being comprised of "all
parts."8 8 Kodak argued that because the parts were not interchangeable, each individual part constituted a separate market.8 9 Moreover, Kodak contended that the ISOs had to prove
that the unavailability of each part led to Kodak's monopolization of the service market. 90 The Ninth Circuit rejected Kodak's
argument 91 and ruled that the market was properly defined by
"the 'commercial realities' faced by ISOs and end users."92 Consumers' assumptions that service providers would have, or could
get any parts necessary for repairs, dictated that all the parts
93
were included in the relevant market.
Both Kodak H and Queen City Pizza indicate the limited applicability of Kodak I's single brand market. These cases emphasize the supremacy of the consumer's market perspective over
that of a plaintiffs. 94 Post-Kodak I cases have tended to look for
broader product agglomerations to define a relevant market,
rather than accept plaintiffs' arguments that the specific product
87 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560 (1998).
88 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998)
(indicating Kodak had argued that ISOs "all parts" market theory has no support in existing antitrust law).
89 See id. (examining Kodak's contention that there are thousands of individual
"part" markets).
90 See id. (explaining Kodak's contention that ISOs must prove that their failure to
obtain nonpatented parts resulted in Kodak's monopoly over service).
91 See id. at 1204-05 (indicating market for Kodak parts fall within "cluster" analysis); see also JBL Entertainment, Inc. v. Jhirmack Enter., Inc., 698 F.2d 1011, 1016-17
(9th Cir. 1983) (indicating "cluster approach" can be used where product package is significantly different from individual products).
92 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1203-05 (explaining market for Kodak parts is amenable
to "cluster" analysis, thereby customers assumedly view service providers as having
ability to obtain any part necessary to complete repairs).
93 See id. at 1204. Even though Kodak was the exclusive manufacturer for only approximately one-third of the total parts and did not even control manufacture of many of
the others. Id. The Court adopted the cluster analysis because disaggregating the markets would have introduced duplicative evidence, but would not have altered the conclusion of monopoly power. Id. As the Court noted, "Kodak's 100% monopoly power over the
30% of parts it manufactures suggests the same potential for control of the service market under an individual part market theory that the jury found using the 'all parts' market." Id. at 1204-05.
94 See Ronald F. Kehoe & James J. Arquin, The Reaction of the Courts and Marketplace Four Years After Kodak, in ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS: LITIGATING AND ADVISING IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY, at 41, 56

(ALI-ABA Course of Study No. SB63, 1997) (explaining that decision in Kodak I was due
to gaps in information available to consumers); Alan H. Silberman, The Myths of Franchise "Market Power" 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 181, 206 (1996) (defining relevant market as
requiring references to all alternatives available to consumers).
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at issue comprises the relevant market. 9 5 Where individual
products are bundled with other items, or constitute subsets of a
group of similar items, it appears more likely that the relevant
market will be broader than the individual item. 9 6
2. Restricting Distribution as Exclusionary Conduct
The second Kodak I boundary offers an even sharper restraint
on intellectual property rights. Although the fundamental principles of intellectual property law impose no duty on owners to
7
deal with competitors, antitrust law circumscribes that right. 9
The Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. Court
explained that a "monopolist may not refuse to deal with a competitor in an exclusionary attempt to impede competition with98
out a legitimate business reason."
In Kodak I, Kodak argued that it was entitled to restrict the
availability of its parts in order to prevent free-riding by its competitors. 99 The ISOs relied on Kodak for primary design and development of the equipment and parts, as well as for service and
diagnostic routines. 10 0 Consequently, the ISOs were essentially
able to enter and exploit aftermarkets without the necessity for
large capital and human investments in the fundamental technologies and infrastructure. 10 1 Without those initial costs, the
95 See Robert H. Lande & Sturgis M. Sobin, Reverse Engineering of Computer Software and U.S. Antitrust Law, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 251 (1996) (indicating relevant
markets consist of any products or groups that compete with product at issue); Reeves &
Boyko, supra note 36, at 1019 (explaining that relevant market was interpreted to include Domino's Pizza franchises and its supplies in one case).
96 See Jay Dratler, Microsoft as an Antitrust Target: IBM in Software?, 25 SW U. L.
REV. 671, 728 (1996) (indicating certain cases turn upon whether relevant market consists of all products of certain type or just subset of compatible products); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure,30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51,
78 (1995) (stating possibility of larger relevant market when items or service are tied).
97 See Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600
(1985) .(recognizing that firm with monopoly has no duty to deal with competitor); see also
Rural Telephone Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 957 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1992)
(asserting that monopolist can refuse to license copyrights where there were no anticompetitve effects); Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 608-09
(6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that it is lawful to refuse to license patents).
98 See Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608. There, as here, a competitor with monopoly
power had restricted the established pattern of distribution in the market in order to
squeeze out its competitors. Id.
99 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992) (explaining Kodak's restrictions were aimed
at preventing ISOs from benefiting from Kodak's investment in copier industry).
100 See id. at 485 (stating Kodak contends ISOs are free-riding because they have not
entered equipment and parts markets).
101 See id. (explaining Kodak's claim that its restrictive policies were to prevent ISOs
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ISOs could maintain a competitive price advantage over Kodak.
In essence, Kodak argued that it restricted entry to the parts
market to force competitors to enter the primary equipment
market in order to participate in the aftermarkets. 10 2 The court
ruled that this was not a legitimate justification. 10 3 In fact, Kodak's actions were contrary to established antitrust law which
04
forbids forcing simultaneous entry into two markets. 1
Conversely, where there has not been a change in the charac105
ter of the market, the attempted monopolization claim fails.
The antitrust analysis; however, will not attach liability to a restriction in distribution patterns as long as the market's character does not change. Thus, if the relevant market had been a
monopoly, distribution restrictions would not make the market
more monopolistic because the market had never been competi06
tive. 1
Intellectual property doctrine does offer some measure of protection from liability for refusal to deal or license.107 Although
from exploiting Kodak's large investments in product development, manufacturing, and
equipment sales).
102 See id. at 483. Kodak couched its argument on three fronts: (1) maintaining a
level of quality of service; (2) reducing inventory costs; and (3) preventing free-riding by
ISOs. Id.
103 See id. at 485 (finding insufficient factual support).
104 See id. at 485 n.33 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977) and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)). In a footnote, however, the Court further noted that seeking to prevent free-riding would be an
acceptable justification if it occurred in the single relevant market. Id. Here, that would
be the service market, instead of the parts and equipment markets, as alleged by Kodak.
Id. Note that the Court previously had accepted exclusionary conduct to prevent freeriding in the context of a manufacturer seeking to ensure that its retail distributors all
made the investments necessary for effective marketing and post-sales support of the
products. Id.
105 See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188
(1st Cir. 1994) (noting impact of market involvement with respect to monopolization). Cf.
Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 505, 594-95 (1985) (marking change in ski resort resulting
from monopolist activity, as well as deeming activity unacceptable); Olympia Equip.
Leasing Co. v. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding no market
change therefore, no illegal activity).
106 See Data Getz. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1188 (explaining Data General had always been
monopolist in service aftermarket, so court could not infer that former policy had allowed
competitive conditions to prevail).
107 See Peter Brown, Unilateral Refusal to License, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

ANTITRUST 1996, at 565, 581-82 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 449, 1996) (interpreting 1995 Department of Justice antitrust guidelines as allowing refusals to license that are not in furtherance of anticompetitive means); Barbara A. Reeves et. al., Unilateral Refusal to License Intellectual
Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1996, at 401, 434 (PLI Patents,

Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 449, 1996)
(generalizing that owner of intellectual property has right to refuse to license); see also
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refusal to license is exclusionary conduct; such refusal is presumptively deemed a legitimate business justification where it is
done to protect a patent or copyright.' 0 8 The burden then shifts
to the plaintiff to rebut that presumption. 1 09 As a result, the ultimate question will be whether this presumption is the actual
reason for the restriction, or merely a pretext for a purely anticompetitive intent.
3. Are Kodak I's Boundaries Independent or Dependent?
The Kodak I decision did not answer the question of whether
its new restrictions on intellectual property rights applied independently of each other, or whether they were interdependent
restrictions. Subsequent courts have proceeded to interpret
those restrictions as interdependent. In order for a single brand
to constitute the relevant market and the distribution change
necessary to create antitrust liability, both lock-in and restrictive
changes in distribution must exist. 110
Robert P. Taylor, Antitrust Issues Arising from Refusals to License Patents and Copyrights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1997, at 793, 807 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 483, 1997) (indicating
1995 Department of Justice guidelines do not state specifically whether refusals to license will be viewed as lawful).
108 See Kenneth M. Frankel, Problems in Licensing Intellectual Propertyfor Software
and Computer Technology: ImportantAntitrust and Misuse Considerations,in COMPUTER
SOFTWARE PROTECTION, at 733, 733 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 479, 1997) (indicating courts gave found refusals to
license as having valid business justifications); James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 354 (1996) (enunciating recent First Circuit decision finding presumption of legitimate business justification in copyright owners refusal to license); see
also Taylor, supra note 107, at 806 (indicating First Circuit has refused to hold copyright
owner's refusal to license as invalid business justification).
109 See Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1187. The Court reasoned that, although the
Copyright Act encourages anti-competitive practices through its grant of exclusive use
and the ability to extract monopolistic prices, this was overcome by the pro-competitive
effects of encouraging investment and innovation. Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 107, at
806. In discussing the court's treatment of the Data Generalcase, the author asserts that
the court created a rebuttable presumption that refusal to license is lawful. Id.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.:
110 See Ronald S. Katz et. al.,
Downfall to the Chicago School of Antitrust Economics, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ANTITRUST
LAW AFTER KODAK AND TICOR: MARKET DEFINITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ECONOMIC
THEORY, AND STATE ACTION, at 1, 10 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C847, 1993) (stating
single brand may constitute relevant market under lock-in theory); Thomas C. Arthur,
The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1992) (interpreting Kodak as requiring both lock-in and distributional restraint to qualify single brands as relevant markets); Barry Reingold, Lower
Court Decisions in the Aftermath of Kodak, 11 NO. 8 COMPUTER LAW 21, 22 (1994)
(indicating Kodak Court found evidence that many users were "locked-in" to use of Kodak's parts and services due to high cost of switching out); Norman E. Rosen, Intellectual
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In Digital Equipment Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies,"'
the plaintiff argued that Kodak I applied to Digital's restrictive
change in resale pricing policy because there was a separate
market for operating systems for Digital computers.1 1 2 The
court disagreed, interpreting Kodak I as turning on a change in
distribution policy which "enabled Kodak to extract supracompetitive prices from customers who had already purchased
its machines."1 1 3 The UNIX operating system was compatible
with competing manufacturers' hardware and Digital was un1 14
able to raise its prices without the risk of losing customers.
Thus, Kodak I did not apply, and distribution restrictions did not
create liability.115
The Kodak I decision was similarly applied by the court in PSI
Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. 1 16 PSI addressed a competitor's ability to force open an aftermarket. 1 17 Honeywell
manufactured and sold industrial control equipment largely
composed of printed circuit boards. 1 18 Most of the boards' components were generic parts, while the remaining few were designed by third party manufacturers, specifically for Honeywell. 1 19 Honeywell did not sell those replacement parts, had
restrictive contracts preventing sales by those manufacturers to
Property and the Antitrust Pendulum: Recent Developments at the Interface Between the
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 676 (1994) (discussing
Kodak Court's determination of effect of customer "lock-in").
111

73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996).

112 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, 73 F.3d at 763 (concluding
DEC failed to exploit customers of its lock-in equipment).
113 See id. (stating Uniq had not supplied evidence of such conduct).
114 See id. (indicating customers who used UNIX were not committed to any specific
hardware).
115 See id. The Court stated, "Customers who use Unix are not committed to any
manufacturer's hardware; they can play the field. One can hardly imagine a weaker case
for the claim that DECs computers are a market unto themselves." Id. Interestingly, this
analysis supports the pre-Kodak I decision in Data General. There, the RDOS operating
system was not compatible with Data General's competitors. Moreover, Data General
was also the seller of the copyrighted operating system as well, a significant difference
from DEC's position.; see also Kehoe, supra note 41, at 233, 257. Digital Equipment Corp.
has been lumped with other post-Kodak I market power cases that have been decided
against the plaintiffs. Id.
116 104 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1997) (granting summary judgment for manufacturer
in ISOs antitrust claim).
117 See PSI Repair Serv. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d at 816 (discussing separate
market just for services).
118 See id. at 813 (explaining Honeywell's market in this situation).
119 See id. at 816 (stating that third party manufacturers make about five percent of
Honeywell's boards).
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third-parties, and maintained control of those circuit boards
during repairs. 12 0 PSI provided circuit board repair services for
owners of competing controller systems, but had been unable to
enter the market for servicing Honeywell equipment. 12 1 PSI
brought suit against Honeywell, alleging both tying and monopolization claims.
The PSI court focused primarily on whether the relevant market was for Honeywell brand components because they were not
interchangeable with others, or whether the market was more
122
appropriately the upstream market for primary equipment.
The Court interpreted Kodak I's single-brand market to arise
only where the aftermarket policy changed and consumers were
locked-in to that brand without the opportunity to consider that
change when purchasing the primary equipment. 12 3 Kodak I
was inapplicable because there was no evidence of aftermarket
change here. Therefore, the relevant market was the market for
the primary equipment. 1 2 4 Because there was no showing of
market power in that competitive market, Honeywell could not
be held liable for antitrust violations. 12 5 In a decision consistent
with Digital Equipment Corp., the PSI court held that a single
brand market does not exist when there is no restrictive change
26
in the distribution pattern. 1
The previous cases indicate that Kodak I's restrictions on intel120 See id. at 813. When the boards fail, Honeywell provides replacements, using
either a new or refurbished board from its own inventory. Id. at 817. Honeywell. then
evaluates and repairs, if possible, the returned board. Id. After refurbishment, the board
will be provided as a replacement part to another customer. Id.
121 See id. at 813-14 (describing PSI's role in market).
122 See id. at 818 (explaining PSI's contention that Honeywell controlled market because its brand components were not interchangeable with those of other manufacturers).
123 See id. at 820. "We likewise agree that the change in policy in Kodak was the
crucial factor in the Court's decision. By change in its policy after its customers were
'locked in,' Kodak took advantage of the fact that its customers lacked the information to
anticipate this change. Therefore, it was Kodak's own action that increased its customers'
information costs." Id.; see also George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?:
Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 ANTITRUST L.J., 177, 180 (1993). The author raises the
issue as to whether a single brand could ever be a relevant market. Id.
124 See PSI Repair Serv., 104 F.3d at 821.
125 See id. Although the district court had initially concluded that Honeywell's proprietary interest in its components was a legitimate basis for its acquisition of monopoly
power in the service aftermarket, the appellate court ruled that, because the relevant
market was that for the primary equipment, the district court's analysis no longer applied. Id.
126 See id. at 822.
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lectual property rights are not independent, but are interdependent. Where consumers are not vulnerable to product lockin, a restrictive change in distribution will not impose unreasonable switching costs on them and antitrust liability will not lie.
In practical terms, the more interchangeable the product is with
its competitors (and therefore the potentially less valuable the
intellectual property rights), the less likely that a manufacturer
or owner will incur antitrust liability from restricting its distribution.
III. AREAS OF DEVELOPING DOCTRINE

The question of market definitions and the defense of preventing "free-riding" are two areas where intellectual property and
antitrust law have recently conflicted. Though currently unsettled, these areas are likely to interest intellectual property owners.
A. Scope of the Intellectual Property Monopoly
The courts have yet to craft a complete and well-defined doctrinal framework for resolving the inherent conflicts between intellectual property and antitrust law. The fundamental question
remaining is: How exactly does antitrust law limit the intellectual property right of refusal to deal? Kodak 11 illustrates the
lack of a complete framework.
In Kodak II, Kodak asserted that it was immunized from antitrust liability because its absolute right to refuse to sell its own
patented parts constituted a valid defense to otherwise exclusionary conduct. 1 27 The Kodak 11 court acknowledged the existence of conflicting objectives between antitrust and intellectual
property laws. 12 8 Furthermore, the court identified the conflicting principles: "(1) neither patent nor copyright holders are immune from antitrust liability, and (2) patent and copyright holders may refuse to sell or license protected work."'1 29 Essentially,
courts will not usually equate a monopolist's refusal to license

127 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560 (1998).
128 See id. at 1215.

129 See id. (noting tensions between antitrust, copyright and patent law).
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their patent and exclusionary conduct. 1 3 0 Nevertheless, lawfulness of an exercise of this right to refuse to sell or license, essentially a right to exclude, depends on whether the owner has attempted to extend the monopoly beyond the scope of the
grant. 13 1 Although the scope of the grant is determined under
intellectual property law, whether that statutory monopoly has
been extended into a separate market is determined under antitrust law using an economic analysis. 13 2 The conceptual difference between the statutory grant and the economically derived
market results in the friction between antitrust and intellectual
property laws.
Unfortunately, rather than harmonize the differences between
market definitions governed by intellectual property law and
those by antitrust and economic principles, the Kodak II court
sidestepped the issue. The court adopted Data General v.
Grumman Systems Support's rebuttable presumption that unilateral refusal to license or sell patented or copyrighted material
is a valid business justification. 133
In adopting this presumption, however, the court implicitly
circumscribed otherwise lawful intellectual property rights. 134
Considering that one of the fundamental rights bestowed by the
monopoly is the right to exclude others, this decision narrows the
lawful scope of that fundamental right by illegitimizing the intent to enforce that right specifically against competitors.
Moreover, the Kodak II decision left unanswered the validity of
those circumstances in which the claimed protection coexists
130 See id. at 1216.
131 See id.
132 See id.; see also Aryeh S. Friedman, Law and the Innovative Process:Preliminary
Reflections, 1986 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 19 (1986) (examining possibility of expanding
monopoly beyond scope of intellectual property right).
133 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218-19. Although the court described this approach as
a harmonization, it undercuts intellectual property rights by continuing to limit intellectual property rights, whose scope is determined by technical or creative concepts, by antitrust market concepts, whose definition is the product of economic analysis. Id. Moreover, inquiry into the potentially pretextual nature of the conduct introduces a new
subjective element into the exercise of intellectual property rights which is not addressed
in the grant of those rights. Id. See generally Dana W. Hayter, When a License is Worse
than a Refusal: A Comparative Competitive Effects Standard to Judge Restrictions in Intellectual Property Licenses, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 288 (1996) (emphasizing recognition of right to unilaterally refuse only where right is lawfully acquired).
134 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1206 (upholding lower court ruling and finding Kodak
held monopoly in parts market by discouraging self-service and resale of parts by end
users).
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The court failed to

recognize the function of intellectual property laws as an impetus for persons to develop and innovate in order to exclude the
competition. As such, the person is rewarded with a lawful monopoly which permits recoupment of their initial investment in
35
research and development and foregone opportunities. 1
In re ISOs Antitrust Litigation 3 6 provides a more doctrinal

approach to dealing with conflict between intellectual property
and antitrust law. A number of ISOs filed suit against Xerox
Corp. for antitrust violations arising out of its 1984 decision to
stop selling parts for certain copier lines to ISOs unless they
were also end-users of the equipment. 137 In the ensuing litigation, the ISOs plead patent and copyright misuse as affirmative
defenses to Xerox's counterclaims for patent and copyright infringement.1 38 Those affirmative defenses alleged that Xerox
used its lawful monopolies over certain copier and printer parts,
software, and manuals to monopolize service markets for the
primary equipment. 139
In granting Xerox a partial summary judgment for antitrust
claims arising out of refusal to sell or license patented items, the
Court addressed the conflict between intellectual property mo140
nopoly rights and antitrust law's market exploitation limits.
Deriving its position from patent law, rather than antitrust law,
the Court noted that:
There is no prohibition, however, from lawfully using a patent to acquire a monopoly in more than one relevant antitrust market. In other words, a single "patent monopoly"
135 See, e.g., In re ISOs Antitrust Litigation, 964 F.Supp 1479, 1489 n. 4 (D. Kan.
1997) (discussing incentive to invest time and money in research of innovation).
136 964 F. Supp. 1479 (D.Kan. 1997).
137 See In re ISOs Antitrust Litigation, 964 F.Supp. at 1480. Although the policy was
announced initially in 1984 and expanded to all subsequent products in 1986, Xerox did
not actually begin implementing it until 1989. Id. In 1994, Xerox settled the resulting
antitrust suit brought by ISOs and agreed to suspend its parts policy for 6 V2 years. Id.
Thereafter, Xerox began charging ISOs higher prices for its parts than it charged customers who purchased the parts to service their own machines. Id. It was undisputed
that Xerox charged these prices not to recoup its development costs, but to drive the ISOs
own service rates to their customers to uncompetitive levels. Id. That practice resulted in
a second antitrust suit and this litigation. Id.
138 See id. at 1482.
139 See id. at 1491.
140 See id. at 1488 (discussing how court, in arriving at decision, examined CSU's
claim that Xerox engaged in patent misuse in light of antitrust law).
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can be used to secure multiple "economic monopolies," i.e.,
monopolies in more than one relevant antitrust market....
If the court held otherwise, then a patent holder rarely could
refuse to license his product without fear that he had not
properly defined the relevant antitrust market or considered
how the relevant market may be defined in the future....
We do not think Congress intended such limited patent protection or to require such perfect foresight by the patent
holder in defining the relevant antitrust market. A patent
holder's rights should not fluctuate from day to day based on
the changing relevant market definitions. 14 1
The court interpreted Kodak H narrowly, so it could apply
more to the tying claim than to the unilateral patent-related
conduct. 1 4 2 More importantly, the court interpreted Kodak's
monopoly power in the service aftermarket as arising more from
14 3
its position in the market, rather than from its patents.
There is no unlawful leveraging of monopoly power when a
patent holder merely exercises its rights inherent in the patent grant. In other words, Xerox did not exploit its dominant position in the parts market to obtain a monopoly in
the service market. Rather, Xerox exploited its lawful patent to obtain a monopoly in both the parts and service markets. Xerox's power and right to exclude ISOs from the
service market arose from its patented invention, not from
its position in the parts market.144
As a result, the court held that even though more than one
economic market was affected, Xerox's refusal to sell or license
the patented parts was within the legitimate scope of its patent

rights

.145

Kodak II and In re ISO's Antitrust Litigation represent the
141 See id. The court also noted the time-sensitive implications of a decision to the
contrary. Id. at 1489. The relevant market may include both parts and service when the
research is originally conducted, and the patent holder would thus have a legitimate expectation of excluding others from use of the invention in that entire relevant market. Id.
If the relevant market later changes in that separate markets for parts and service become recognized, the patent holder's lawful patent rights would be partially extinguished
by antitrust law. Id. at 1488 n.4.
142 See id, at 1490 (applying concentrated and contractual activity in context of tying
claim).
143 See In re ISOs Antitrust Litigation, 964 F.Supp. at 1490.
144 See id. at 1489.
145 See id. "Although a patent holder perhaps expands his 'economic power' by this
conduct, he has not expanded the scope of the patented 'invention."' Id.

196

ST. JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 13:171

current state of judicial decisions in the underlying doctrine.
Additional decisions will have to provide further refinement and,
ultimately, resolution. In the meantime, intellectual property
owners are left to face the prospect of protracted litigation over
their refusal to deal with their competitors.
B. Ability to Prevent Competitors from Free-Riding
A second area of uncertainty exists where defendants have asserted their refusal to deal as a legitimate response to their competitors' free-riding. These defendants further assert their competitors sought to compete in the aftermarkets without making
the necessary research and development investment in the primary market. 1 4 6 In Kodak I, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the legitimacy of utilizing a refusal to deal with this
"cross-market" free-riding. 147
Despite that rejection, the anti-free-riding defense has been
accepted as legitimate in certain narrow circumstances, albeit in
the context of a copyright or patent misuse claim. 1 48 In those
cases, parties alleged patent or copyright misuse as a defense to
an infringement suit. 149 The basis for this defense is the other
party's exclusionary conduct couched in terms of monopolization
or attempted monopolization. In essence, the defendant, in a
146 See, e.g., Kodak 1, 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992) (failing to participate in parts and
equipment market seen as free-riding); Kodak II, 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560 (1998) (arguing Kodak's refusal to sell parts to ISOs is rebuttable presumption of legitimacy); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d
1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no benefit to the public in allowing continuance of
Southeastern's practices). See generally David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the
Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18
HASTINGS COMM. ENT. L.J., 771, 810 (1996) (arguing for rebuttal based on attempt to
combat free-riding by competitors); C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the
MisappropriationDoctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2
HIGH TECH L.J., 55, 60 (1987) (discussing tendency in intellectual property domain for
free-riding).
147 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 485-n.33; see also Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1219. The defense was again rejected in Kodak II. Id. See, e.g., Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 998
F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1993). There, the court noted that manufacturers have a legitimate "interest in preventing 'free-riding'." Id. To maintain order and service levels
among the manufacturer's distribution network, manufacturers may take unilateral and
anti-competitive action against a free-riding dealer without incurring antitrust liability.
Id. at 576.
148 See Reeves & Boyko, supra note 36, 1031 (explaining anti free-riding defense as
necessary anticompetitive conduct to prevent others from taking advantage of own invention).
149 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 100 (1969)
(defining patent misuse as refusal of payment).
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misuse case, is alleged to have used its copyright or patent to
unlawfully extend its monopoly to products outside the scope of
the defendant's intellectual property grant. 150
In Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 1 5 1 Triad
copyrighted its operating system and diagnostic software for
specialized computers for auto parts stores. 15 2 After approximately a decade of operations, Triad stopped selling its software
and began a licensing program which did not allow customers to
copy the program or allow third parties to use it. In response to
Triad's suit for copyright infringement, Southeastern, a competitor in the service aftermarket, argued the affirmative defenses of
fair use and copyright misuse. 153 With respect to misuse,
Southeastern argued that Triad had unlawfully extended its
software copyright into the market for service of that software. 15 4 The court was not persuaded by either of Southeastern's arguments. In contrast to Kodak I, the court recognized a
valid anti-free-riding defense:
Triad invented, developed, and marketed its software to
service Triad computers. Southeastern is getting a free ride
when it uses that software to perform precisely the same
service. Triad is entitled to licensing fees from Southeastern
and other ISOs that make use of Triad's software in servicing Triad's computers. 15 5
Except for an unreported district court decision, this reasoning
6
has yet to be applied to other antitrust litigation. 15
150 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. 441 U.S. 1, 1 (1979)
(holding general license issued to television networks failed to constitute price fixing or
copyright misuse); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22 (holding
copyright misuse as precluding enforcement but not invalidating copyright completely).
151 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
152 See Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1339.
153 See id. at 1338. Triad sought (and received) a preliminary injunction against further servicing of its computers by Southeastern. Id. at 1334. Southeastern appealed the
issuance of that injunction. Id. at 1334.
154 See id. at 1337. The court struck down the fair use defense, noting that
"Southeastern is simply commandeering its customers' software and using it for the very
purpose for which, and in precisely the manner in which, it was designed to be used. Id.
As a result, the copies made by Southeastern have undoubtedly diminished the value of
Triad's copyright." Id.
155 See id. (holding Triad's copyright extends to service market).
156 See In re ISOs Antitrust Litigation, 1997 WL 161941 (D. Kan. 1997). Triad was
cited with approval here. This case involved an affirmative defense to ISOs' claim of monopolization of service markets for high speed copiers, Xerox asserted that its conduct
was justified in order to minimize the ISOs free-riding on Xerox's investments in service
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Interestingly, where the two markets were functionally interdependent products (i.e. hardware and software components for
an integrated device), rather than a functionally interdependent
product and service (i.e. diagnostic software and service), the
free-riding defense was rejected. 15 7 In DSC Communications
Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.,1 5 8 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion. 15 9 DSC manufactured
telephone switching systems and held a copyright on the software used in the microprocessors that were embedded in the
physical devices. Although DSC sold the systems outright, it licensed only the software, thereby restricting its use to equipment purchased from DSC and barring copying. 1 60 Its competitor, DGI, surreptitiously copied DSC's software, while seeking to
develop a compatible microprocessor card for use in DSC
switches. DSC sued DGI for copyright infringement and obtained a preliminary injunction.1 6 1 The injunction was reversed
on appeal because the appellate court concluded that DGI may
prevail on its defense of copyright misuse. 1 62 The court held that
DSC was attempting to use its copyrighted operating system to
obtain a monopoly over otherwise unpatented microprocessor
cards. 16 3 The court's decision relied upon the reality that any
manuals, documents, and diagnostic software. Id. at *1. Relying on Kodak 's rejection of
the free-riding defense, one plaintiff sought summary judgment on this issue. Id. However, the court denied the motion. Id. at *3. It distinguished this case from Kodak I because here the alleged free-riding was in the same market, that for service, rather than
across markets. Id. Further, the plaintiff failed to establish why it would have had to enter the primary equipment market in order to compete for service, as was alleged in Kodak L Id.
157 See id. (rejecting free-riding defense).
158 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).

159 See DSC Communications Corp., 81 F.3d at 601 (suggesting defenses of copyright
misuse and patent misuse are analogous).
160 See generally Sheila J. McCartney, Antitrust/Misuse Concerns in Licensing, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1994, at 143, 166-67 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,

Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 390, 1994) (suggesting methods to avoid antitrust violation when licenser and licensee deal in competing products).
161 See DSC Communications Corp., 81 F.3d at 599 (prohibiting DGI from copying
DSC's software, but not from other related procedures).
162 See generally Morgan Chu et. al., Patent Misuse, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

ANTITRUST 1993, at 557, 561 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 365, 1993) (explaining history of misuse theory); David
Scher, The Visibility of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 89-90
(1992) (explaining misuse doctrine and applications).
163 See generally Joseph M. Callow, Jr., Cut-Throat Competition in the Friendly
Skies: Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. 681, 703-04 (explaining
court's distinction of predatorily obtained monopolies from "superior product" monopolies); David M. Rierman, The Grinnell Test of Monopolization Sounds a False Alarm: As-
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competing microprocessor card was required to be compatible
with both: (1) the operating system software; and (2) the hardware of the switching assembly. 1 64 This appeared to be an unlawful extension of DSC's software copyright over the unpat16 5
ented processor hardware.
These cases seem to indicate partial viability for an anti-freeriding defense, even though such defense only applies to limited
market structures. It remains unclear whether the free-riding
defense is allowable only within the same market, or whether
there are circumstances in which companies will be allowed to
block cross-market free-riding. In the meantime, the extent to
which these decisions should be interpreted and the degree to
which they represent doctrinal guideposts is a conclusion that
awaits further discussion by the courts.
CONCLUSION

Under a strictly intellectual property law analysis, it is clear
that antitrust law imposes restrictions on conduct that is otherwise lawful. Despite the familiar precept, heightened by the
statutory monopolies of copyrights and patents, that there is no
duty to deal with one's competitors, antitrust law imposes such a
duty. It establishes boundaries on those monopolies by imposing
liability when the intellectual property owner restricts dealings
with competitors. Moreover, in a twist of logic, the more unique
and valuable the intellectual property, the more likely that a refusal to deal will be a basis for antitrust liability. However,
when the refusal to deal emerges as potentially exclusionary
conduct because it emerges as a change to an established pattern
of distribution, the owner is faced with the choice between never
licensing or selling the product to competitors, or always doing
SO.

Additionally, the present state of antitrust analysis of intellectual property rights appears to devalue the damage to those
pen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 28 B.C. L. REV. 415, 449 (stating court's
determination that monopolies obtained through use of business skills do not violate antitrust law).
164 See DSC Communications Corp., 81 F. 3d at 597.
165 See id. at 601 (finding no error in District Court's implicit acceptance of DGI's
misuse defense).
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rights caused by free-riding competitors. Kodak I and Kodak II
expressly rejected the intellectual property owner's right to bar
sales to competitors as an attempt to prevent free-riders. The
analysis in these decisions is the polar opposite of analysis under
intellectual property law. Thus, it remains a troubling matter for
intellectual property owners and requires further clarification
and resolution.
In a similar vein, resolving the doctrinal differences between
the broad scope of intellectual property grants and the economic
definition of relevant markets for antitrust purposes remains an
unsettled area. The potential variability of economically defined
markets imposes an additional restriction on the lawful scope of
intellectual property rights. Furthermore, economically defined
markets devalue the full potential of those intellectual property
rights. However, this issue, as well, requires a doctrinal resolution.

